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Summary
In deterministic theories, one can start from a set of ontological states to formulate the dynamical
laws, but these may not be directly observable. Observable are only equivalence classes of states,
and these will span a basis of “beables”, to be promoted to an orthonormal basis of Hilbert Space.
After transforming this basis to a more conventional basis, a theory may result that is fundamentally
quantum mechanical. It is conjectured that the quantum laws of the real world may be understood
from exactly such a procedure.
Dice
Quantum Mechanics works. It first served as a successful doctrine for describing the dynamical laws
for electrons inside atoms. Subsequently, it was realized that quantum mechanics must be more universally
valid, so it should also apply to the atomic nuclei and to the elementary particles out of which these nuclei
are composed.
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Including the requirements of special relativity has been a major challenge. At first sight, it seemed
that quantum mechanics was to undergo substantial revisions in order to meet this challenge. The words
”second quantization” underlined the fact that Schro¨dinger’s equation for single particles was to be replaced
by the equations for quantized fields.
But the fundamental starting points of quantum mechanics were not seriously altered by the advent of
quantum field theory. Rather, they were generalized and deepened. Non-Abelian gauge theories — essential
building blocks of the Standard Model — added a further complication: the emergence of ghost particles,
required for achieving unambiguously renormalized amplitudes, but again, one has to conclude that the
fundamental dogmas of quantum mechanics not only survived, but also served as a backbone for these
theories. In accordance with these rules, the quantized field theory must provide for the scattering matrix
(S -matrix) amplitudes, and the scattering probabilities should follow from these. Should we depart from
the usual “Copenhagen” rules for interpreting the amplitudes, then we would not even know how to start
formulating consistent theories.
For the last couple of decades, theoreticians have been considering the challenge to include the one
remaining theoretical requirement: general relativity, i.e., the laws of gravity. The problem appears to be
a beautiful one, since now the dynamics of the curvature in space and time must be submitted to the laws
of quantum mechanics. The virtual contributions to the amplitudes due to space-time curvature diverge at
the small-distance end, just like Fermi’s earliest models for the weak force used to do. In the latter case,
the divergences were successfully tamed by the introduction of the Standard Model. Naturally, one expects
similar solutions to the problem at hand, and indeed, string theories and their successors are claimed to
come close to bringing just such a solution.
But, they have not done so yet, and upon closer inspection one finds that there really are reasons to be
skeptical. Not only are there numerous technical difficulties — the identification of the ground state, our lack
of understanding the supersymmetry breaking mechanism, the smallness of the cosmological constant —,
there are also more fundamental ones, which are difficulties that have little to do with the fact that we are
dealing with strings, D -branes, or what not. Rather, they have to do with the fact that we are attempting
to apply quantum mechanics to dynamical laws that should be the ultimate driving forces of the entire
Universe; one will be forced to consider statistical ensembles of universes, and such notions will be much
more questionable than the notion of an ensemble of experiments inside one universe. It should be kept in
mind that one will never be able to do experiments in more than one universe, and that the ‘averaged value’
of a quantity measured in different universes cannot be checked against any theory.
Quantum fluctuations of the space-time metric at distances at or below the Planck scale diverge, and the
implications of this may well be deeper than the need to re-sum some divergent perturbation series. Under
these circumstances, causality and unitarity may become impossible to keep under control, regarding the
difficulties in establishing time ordering. It should be clear that, at this point, the most serious difficulties
may be associated to our insistence to keep the quantum rules unchanged.
It is illustrative, in this respect, to study a beautiful toy model for a universe: point particles gravitating
in a 2+1 dimensional universe 1 , while obeying Einstein’s equations. The classical equations are exactly
soluble in 2+1 dimensional space-times, during finite time intervals, but they become chaotic near a big bang
or a big crunch. Poisson brackets can be written down for this system, but replacing these by commutators
fails, exactly because the notion of a Hilbert space becomes problematic when it refers to entire universes.
It is here that I would like to advocate a different approach. We should not forget that quantum
mechanics does not really describe what kind of dynamical phenomena are actually going on, but rather
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gives us probabilistic results. To me, it seems extremely plausible that any reasonable theory for the
dynamics at the Planck scale would lead to processes that are so complicated to describe, that one should
expect apparently stochastic fluctuations in any approximation theory describing the effects of all of this at
much larger scales. It seems quite reasonable first to try a classical, deterministic theory for the Planck
domain. One might speculate then that what we call quantum mechanics today, may be nothing else than
an ingenious technique to handle this dynamics statistically.
Of course I am aware of the numerous studies regarding the difficulties in devising hidden variable
theories for quantum mechanics. Deterministic theories appear to lead to the famous Bell inequalities 2 , and
the Einstein-Rosen-Podolsky paradox 3 . There are various possible reasons nevertheless to continue along
this avenue. Generally speaking, we could take the attitude that every “no-go theorem” comes with some
small-print, that is, certain conditions and assumptions that are considered totally natural and reasonable
by the authors, but which may be violated in the real world. Certainly, physics at the Planck scale will
be quite alien to us, and therefore, expecting some or several of the “natural” looking conditions to be
violated is not so objectionable. More specifically, one might try to identify some of such conditions. One
example might be the following: turning some apparatus at will, in order to measure either the x- or the
y -component of an electron’s spin, requires invariance of the device under rotations, allowing the detector to
rotate independently of the rest of the scenery. This is unlikely to be totally admissible in terms of Planck
scale variables.
Another attitude could be to assume that deterministic approaches might only succeed partially but not
completely. Locally deterministic approaches might become useful for the identification of local dynamical
rules, but maybe some quantum mechanical constraint will have to be added at a later stage, thus restoring
the quantum mechanical nature of the entire description. In some of the calculations shown below, it can be
seen that such constraints can exist, since already at an early stage we do turn to Hilbert space techniques,
and there, one may well introduce fully quantum mechanical projection operators that only slightly modify
the dynamics.
Let us simply keep an open mind, and just see where a deterministic approach leads us. Whether or
not to call my most recent results promising, the reader may decide for him- or herself.
The most logical domain of physics where one may expect Quantum Mechanics to become replaceable by
a more deterministic scenario is the Planck scale. One reason for this expectation was already mentioned: the
unwieldy strangeness of the world of stringlike phenomena which might invalidate some of the assumptions
made, be it consciously or tacitly, when arguments using the Bell inequalities are applied to prove hidden
variables to be impossible or at least non local. Another reason for taking the Planck regime is the emergence
of black holes there. On the one hand, a conventional quantum mechanical description of black holes appears
to contradict General Relativity; on the other hand, a classical (read: deterministic) description of black
holes implies the feature of information loss. Information loss may indeed be admitted in deterministic
theories, and, as we shall argue further, information loss may be the key ingredient that could turn a local,
deterministic theory into a quantum theory.
Nevertheless, one could observe that reference to the gravitational force is not truly necessary for our
considerations. One might hope that the search for a theory behind Quantum Mechanics could provide for
further costraints on the apparently arbitrary constants of Nature in the Standard Model, long before the
Planck scale is reached, but I am not counting on such a miracle.
My starting point is basically very simple. The dividing line between quantum physics and classical
physics is more subtle than usually advertised. Hilbert space techniques, as an aid to discuss statistical
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features, can be introduced for deterministic systems 4—7 just like in notoriously “quantum mechanical”
theories. A deterministic system is characterized by a set of evolution equations that tell unambiguously
how it evolves in time, given its initial configuration. The definition of time does not need to be very strict.
One might have a continuous time variable or discretized time, or time might be defined in terms of Cauchy
surfaces in a general relativistic setting. There is one important condition that must be met by the time
variable, however: it must be on a real line (possibly with a beginning and/or an end to it). Time is not
allowed to be cyclic. If closed time-like trajectories would exist, this would lead into clashes and our theory
would no longer be unambiguous. Closed time-like loops, popular in some versions of gravity theories, will
be excluded.
First, we assume that the evolution is time-reversible (an assumption that may later be relaxed). We
attach a basis element of a Hilbert space to every possible configuration of the Universe at a given time t ,
so the ensemble of all possible configurations spans a Hilbert space. If now time is discrete, then one step in
time is associated to a permutation operator in the space of states, and it corresponds to a unitary evolution
operator U(∆t) in Hilbert space, where ∆t is the time quantum. In each row and on each column of U
there is one entry equal to 1 and the other entries are 0.
Subsequently, one may define an operator H such that
U(∆t) = exp(−iH∆t) . (1)
This operator is not unambiguously defined; one may freely add or subtract multiples of 2π/∆t to its
eigenvalues.
If time is continuous, we have equations in a space of coordinates {qi} , of the form
d
dt
qi = f i(~q) , (2)
where f i may be any kind of functions of the coordinates qi . We limit ourselves to first-order differential
equations because, of course, higher order equations can be reduced to first order ones by enlarging the space
of independent variables qi . In our Hilbert space, this equation is the Schro¨dinger equation corresponding
to the Hamiltonian
H =
∑
i
pif i(~q) + gi(~q) , (3)
where
pi
def
= − i
∂
∂qi
, (4)
and gi is an arbitrary function. Note that pi are the true momentum operators in the quantum mechanical
sense, even though we are discussing deterministic theories. The point here is, that the Hamiltonian (3) is
linear in the momenta, as opposed to the usual quadratic expressions in ‘real’ quantum mechanics.
Using either the Hamiltonian defined in (1) or the one in (3), one may use all conventional prescriptions
from Quantum Mechanics and calculate the evolution of any ‘wave function’. The absolute squares of its
coefficients may always be interpreted as probabilities. It is important to observe that in these systems the
‘collapse of the wave function’ means absolutely nothing; there are probability distributions, and as soon as
one measures something, our knowledge concerning the state collapses towards only one of various alternative
possibilities, and that is all there is to it.
But of course our systems are not truly quantum mechanical. With our choices of the Hamiltonian,
wave functions do not ‘spread’; there seem to be no interference effects, and it seems to be difficult to create
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‘coherent states’. The question is, can one make a link between the deterministic systems described above
and theories that look more like genuine quantum mechanical systems?
Let us first introduce some definitions. The basis elements of our Hilbert space refer to states the
‘universe can really be in’. We call these states ‘ontological states’. They may be realized or not realized,
and, at least in our deterministic models, there is no possibility in between, although in our analysis we shall
often take our refuge into probability concepts.
An operator that measures which of these ontological states we are in, will be called a beable, a` la John
Bell. Beables form a set of operators that are defined at all times, and they all commute with one another.
An operator that replaces an ontological state by another ontological state will be called a changeable.
Changeables may also add any kind of phase factors to the states. All operators presently known, and
used in the Standard Model, must be changeables. Changeables do in general not commute, but they can
sometimes be diagonalised. Physicists living in a deterministic world may be unable to distinguish beables
from changeables.
At first sight, our deterministic models may seem to be trivial, and one may suspect that there is a wide
gap between these and truly quantum mechanical models.
Just like in ‘true quantum mechanics’, we have a Hilbert space and a Hamiltonian. Where exactly is the
gap between deterministic and ‘truly quantum mechanical’ theories? A very important distinction appears
to be that the Hamiltonian (3) is not bounded from below. There is no ground state. In ordinary quantum
mechanics we do have a ground state. But here also one might have to look at the gravitational force.
When gravitational collapse is admitted, and protons are allowed to decay, states usually considered to be
ground states are not truly ground states. There may be an alley here. Conversely, one might consider the
Hamiltonian (3) and impose constraints. In some models, this Hamiltonian can be seen to be the difference
between two commuting, positive operators 6 :
H = H1 −H2 ; [H1, H2] = 0 . (5)
Imposing the constraint
H2|ψ〉 = 0 , (6)
on our states |ψ〉 , leaves us the Hamiltonian H1 , which may be bounded from below. Are there other
manipulations that can be performed to turn our system into one where the Hamiltonian does have a ground
state?
If time is discrete, the Hamiltonian is bounded, so of course there is a ground state. Here, however, the
eigenvalues are well-defined apart from multiples of 2π/∆t , so here the problem is that the choice of the
ground state appears to be arbitrary. If our world could be related to a deterministic scenario at the Planck
scale, then why does the vacuum state of our world appear to be unique, whereas it is either arbitrary or
ill-defined in our deterministic models?
The answer to this may be that one possible refinement has not yet been mentioned. In the beginning
of our formalism, we assumed that, in the deterministic model, the evolution law is time-reversible. If time
is discrete, this needs not be the case. Two different configurations might evolve into the same final state.
We call this ‘information loss’, or ‘dissipation’. At first sight, the introduction of information loss appears to
be a disaster. We now no longer have a unitary evolution matrix, so we cannot define a Hamiltonian at all.
However, the damage can be repaired. In principle, we could decide to ‘remove’ from consideration all those
states that now cannot be reached at all from any configuration in the distant past. Then time reversibility
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might be restored, and we are back in the previous situation. In practice, however, this is infeasible. It
may be too difficult to identify the states without a past (“Gardens of Eden”). Another avenue may be
the following. Instead of single states, we now use the concept of ‘equivalence classes of states’. Two states
are equivalent iff within some finite time period they both evolve into the same final state. A basis element
of Hilbert space is defined to be such an equivalence class. The time evolution of equivalence classes is
time-reversible by construction.
How can the introduction of equivalence classes affect the ground state problem? The Hamiltonian is
still the one defined in Eq. (1), and its ground state is still ill-defined. However, the notion of locality is
severely affected. Locally, one cannot distinguish the equivalence classes, so it may appear to be impossible
to define local operators. Notice, that this resembles the situation in gauge theories, where gauge-invariance
causes complications in defining local observables (local operators have a high dimensionality). In string
theories, local observables are even more difficult to define.
Our ontological states may still evolve according to a completely local law, but the equivalence classes
are not locally well-defined. Therefore, our theory may have the property that information cannot spread
faster than a certain velocity, say the velocity of light, but its quantum states cannot be characterized locally.
We do expect that the Hamiltonian H of such a theory can be expressed as the integral over a Hamiltonian
density H(~x), with
[H(~x),H(~x′)] = 0 if ~x 6= ~x′ ; H
def
=
∫
H(~x)d~x . (7)
The effects of introducing information loss and the equivalence classes may be drastic. The classes may
be very large, so that the dimensionality of Hilbert space may be greatly reduced. For instance, in the case
of black holes, the total number of quantum states is known to grow exponentially, but only with the area of
the horizon, and not its volume — the well-known holographic principle. Clearly, quantum states are related
to ontological states after applying sequences of projection operators. It is these projection operators that
may be responsible for curtailing the Hamiltonian as well. There was arbitrariness in the definition of H ,
but insisting on equations such as (7), we might find that H(~x) does have a natural lower bound, so that
this H has one as well. We suspect that this is how our Hamiltonian receives a ground state.
In this light, one may regard our newest publication 7 . In there, we show that free bosons are in fact
deterministic, but only if one restricts oneself to those observables which are invariant under a specially
chosen group of gauge transformations. One may either consider these gauge transformations as an indelible
ingredient of our theory, or one might say that these are representing transitions about which information
gets lost. It is then the equivalence classes that possess this gauge invariance, not the ontological degrees of
freedom.
This is an example where we can see our proposal work. Besides our deterministic model leading
to second quantized free bosons of any mass, another deterministic model could be constructed whose
Hamiltonian turns out to be that of non-interacting massless fermions. These fermions appear to behave
as flat sheets rather than particles. Here also, one may suspect that these sheets represent equivalence
classes rather than ontological variables. Both for the fermions and the bosons, the Hamiltonian could be
made bounded from below. As yet the models we could produce do not seem to be physically very realistic,
let alone impressive, but they are to be taken seriously. The search for more models is under way. It is
comforting to realize that superstring theory makes full use of freely propagating bosons and fermions along
the string world sheet. Since the construction of deterministic quantum theories works particularly well for
free bosons and massless fermions, these theories are ideally suited for being incorporated into the picture
advocated here.
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We think the above gives some idea about the approach that I wish to advertise. Quantum mechanical
features can be obtained from completely deterministic scenarios, in such a way that the Born interpretation
of the wave function as a probability amplitude is completely respected. Of course, we expect the reader to be
skeptical. A number of issues should be confronted in order to become more convincing. Most of these have
to do with ‘quantum weirdness’. Quantum mechanics has given us so many surprising and counter intuitive
features of the submicroscopic world that many have come to conclude that it will be forever impossible to
construct deterministic, or ‘ontological’ theories. Let me begin with the relatively easy issues.
— Quantum interference. The prototype experiment is the electron two-slit experiment. If an electron
is allowed to go only through one of the two slits, a relatively smooth pattern of electrons is detected on the
screen behind the slits. If the electron is given the choice between two slits, an interference pattern arises.
There may be constructive or destructive interference.
In theories of the type proposed here, this is not at all a forbidden phenomenon. The operators that
characterize the presence of an electron apparently cannot be beables, because the operator that detects an
electron at one of the slits does not commute with the operator that detects an electron on the screen behind
the slits. Electrons are not the ontological variables of the deterministic system. The fields ψ introduced
by physicists to describe electrons are changeables, to be constructed from the primordial variables of the
theory.
The same holds, in a more obvious way, for the spin of a particle. Spin is the eigenvalue of a rotation
operator. Surely, rotations replace ontological states by different states. The operators measuring spins are
changeables.
— Quantum coherence and entanglement. I am often asked how, in deterministic theories, coherent
and/or entangled quantum states can arise. How they can arise out of inconspicuous initial states, I do
not know, but it should be stressed that the notion of states is here as in genuine quantum mechanics.
All quantum states may be considered. We may prepare any initial state we like, and ask how it evolves
with time. It is important to emphasize that our description of states is exactly as in genuine quantum
mechanics. We allow the use of operators with non-trivial commutation rules. These states merely describe
our choice of the probablities of the various possible configurations at any given time. So we definitely allow
these probabilities to be as in a state with ‘quantum coherence’. Where our theories differ from conventional
quantum mechanics is our choice of the dynamics. The dynamical rules are deterministic, but only after one
has been able to identify what the basis of Hilbert space is that corresponds to the ontological states, or the
equivalence classes (which are also ontological). The description of this basis may be deeply hidden in the
Planckian regime.
— The Einstein-Rosen-Podolsky paradox and the violation of the Bell inequalities. This is surely the
most difficult aspect to be addressed, and a completely satisfactory response has not yet been given. Part
of an answer can perhaps be found in the observations made above: we do admit non-commuting operators
and states in which some of these are diagonalized. But this does not explain why and how experiments can
be performed that defy any description in terms of local, ontological observables. We must conclude that the
observables commonly used are not ontological. They are not beables. This however leads to the question:
how can it be that, at any given time, an experimenter can choose to measure either the x− or the y− , or
the z− component of a spin, as if these were beables?
Before attempting to answer this question, we should decide about a related topic: is a registration of
an experimental result, fixed in a classical way, a beable? If the motion of planets is partly determined by
haphazard events with a quantum mechanical origin (particularly relevant if the motion is a chaotic one,
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such as most Newtonian systems), are the coordinates of planets, or at least their first 20 or 30 decimal
places, beables?
The answer here is most probably yes. So the previous question remains: how can changeables turn
into beables in the course of a measurement?
My suspicion is that the relation between changeables and beables at the atomic scale is extremely
complex. It is already fairly complicated to express the x variable and the p variable of a harmonic oscil-
lator in terms of its beables, as described in Ref 7 . In more realistic theories that include interactions, it
might involve the changeables and beables of the experimenter himself, when the decision is made which
component of the spin to measure. This is what Bell called predeterminism. The experimenter’s decisions
also follow from Standard Model interactions in his brain. Predeterminism is here defined by the assumption
that the experimenter’s ‘free will’ in deciding what to measure (such as his choice to measure the x- or the
y -component of an electron’s spin), is in fact limited by deterministic laws, hence not free at all, so that it
must be included in a deterministic interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. Most physicists dismiss predeter-
minism as a likely resolution of the EPR paradox. I am not so certain about this. The entire combination,
experimenter/experiment, should be understood by performing a renormalization group transformation from
the Planck scale to the atomic scale. But exactly how all of this should be worked out is far from understood.
On the other hand, it also remains to be seen whether the EPR paradox and Bell’s inequalities are real
contradictions at all, or whether they can simply be ignored. If our models work, they explain quantum
mechanics, and it could be that the apparent violation of Bell’s inequalities will be seen as a natural conse-
quence. Although in any case, more understanding of this situation is desired, it is legitimate to postpone
answering these questions until more sophisticated models have been found. The existence of unanswered
questions of this sort does not invalidate our approach, so we continue research in this direction.
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